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ABSTRACT 
 Autonomous vehicle systems, to include multi-vehicle systems, are becoming 
increasingly relevant in military operations. A problem emerges, however, when logging 
data within these systems. In particular, loss of individual vehicles and inherently lossy 
and noisy communications environments can result in the loss of important mission data. 
This thesis presents a novel distributed ledger protocol that can be used to ensure that the 
data in such a system survives. We demonstrate the behavioral correctness of this 
protocol using informal verification methods and tools provided by the Monterey 
Phoenix project. We further verified the correctness of this protocol through the conduct 
of implementation field tests at Camp Roberts, CA. 
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Distributed ledgers are viable options for businesses and governments to use as a way to
verify the availability of data for post-mission analysis. In certain applications, the use of
well-designed distributed ledgers has benefits that far outweigh the added infrastructure and
resource costs associated with implementing them. A distributed ledger is a way of storing
information that differs from traditional databases in that is a database that is shared and
synchronized across multiple sites and utilizes a consensus process [1]. Depending upon
the application, the amount of data stored in a distributed ledger may be similar to, or much
less than found in traditional databases [2].
1.1 Problem Statement
In distributed, multi-vehicle, autonomous systems, the most effective method of storing data
is often dependent on the purpose of the system. In this project, we assume that individual
vehicles observe and log notable events. Due to the nature of their operations, however,
they may be unable to immediately share these logged events. In military operations, we
must assume that there is a possibility that vehicles may be lost or destroyed. We also
must assume that individual vehicles or groups of vehicles may experience periods of
disconnected communication with other vehicles in the system. Collectively, this creates a
requirement for dependable distributed log maintenance that is robust to vehicle losses and
communications discontinuities. The focus of the research conducted in this project was to
provide a solution for a few problems that distributed, autonomous, multi-vehicle systems
may face in warfare. This research provides a solution that answers the following questions:
1. Can we create a distributed ledger protocol (DLP) that ensures data is distributed
within the system, so that data generated by an individual vehicle survives its destruc-
tion by being stored on other vehicles in the system?
2. Can this DLP account for temporary discontinuity in the system’s communications
graph?
3. What can we prove about the correctness of this DLP?
1
4. Can we use a lightweight modeling system (e.g., Monterey Phoenix [3]) to facilitate
the development process?
1.2 Motivation
To motivate this research and appreciate why it is significant, we examine the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) for 2018. In the National Defense Strategy of 2018, the Department
of Defense (DoD) prioritizes investment in the domain of cyberspace. The strategy states,
“We will also invest in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber
capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations” [4]. The DLP designed in this
thesis project addresses mission event logging resilience. The DLP we created provides a
solution that will allow unmanned autonomous systems operated by the DoD to maintain
mission reconstruction resilience in the event that individual unmanned vehicles (UVs) are
lost or destroyed.
1.3 Scope
The focus of the research presented here was the creation and verification of a DLP for
UVs. The purpose of this protocol is to increase the likelihood that data in multi-vehicle,
autonomous system survives the destruction or loss of a subset of the vehicles in the system.
This thesis research served to complete two essential tasks. The first was to develop a DLP
that can be used in distributed, multi-vehicle, autonomous systems to store logged events.
The desired product for this task was a DLP that could be represented with both diagrams
and pseudocode. The diagrams and psuedocode were necessary to facilitate the completion
of the second task: verification that the DLP works as intended. This was accomplished by
creating models with the Monterey Phoenix (MP) platform. In the second task pseudocode
produced in the first task was translated into an abstracted behavioral model for use in MP.
The behavioral model was used to verify the correctness of the DLP.
1.4 Research Methodology
To create the DLP for this project, an extensive literature review was conducted regarding
distributed ledgers, block chains, MP, and distributed systems reaching consensus. After
gaining background knowledge, Peter Pommer, my classmate at Naval Postgraduate School
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(NPS), and I jointly developed a DLP that addresses the needs of a distributed, autonomous,
multi-vehicles system. The protocol is documented using both diagrams and psuedocode
representations. To verify the correctness of the DLP, two abstracted models were created
so that they could be analyzed using Monterey Phoenix (MP). The reason that we had to
use two different MP models was because we needed to examine different behaviors of the
DLP. These abstracted models had two key requirements that had to be satisfied for MP
to work properly. First, they had to directly map to the DLP described in Chapter 3, and,
second, they had to provide the ability to prove the behavioral correctness of the features we
designed into the DLP. After the abstracted models were created, they were converted to
MP code. Once the MP code was completed for both models it was run on the MP platform.
The results were analyzed to see if the DLPs behavior violated the intent of the DLPs design.
Additionally, we conducted field tests at Camp Roberts to provide further verification of the
behavioral correctness of the DLP designed for our unmanned aerial system (UAS). After
verifying the DLP, we made conclusions and identified possible future work.
1.5 Organization
This thesis contains five more chapters. In Chapter 2, we will discuss the aforementioned
background topics: distributed ledgers, block chains, Monterey Phoenix (MP), and dis-
tributed systems reaching consensus. In Chapter 3, we will present the detailed DLP that we
created for this project. This presentation will include: requirements, a protocol summary,
terminology, assumptions made, the block chain structure, a high level overview and the
detailed protocol. In Chapter 4, we examine the work that was conducted with Monterey
Phoenix (MP). This examination will include abstracted models, MP code, and behavior of
the DLP in the MP models. In Chapter 5, we discuss how MP helped to refine the DLP we
created. We also discuss results that were received from the field tests conducted at Camp
Roberts. Finally, in Chapter 6 we will review the work completed for this thesis and provide
direction for future work.
3




For this project, the goal is to utilize a distributed ledger to improve the resilience of
unmanned vehicle systems (UVSs). To satisfy our goal, we had to create a DLP that in-
creases availability of data in distributed multi-vehicle autonomous UVSs whose individual
elements have a high risk of failure or destruction. In a DLP, integrity is typically the pri-
mary benefit of the ledger’s development and implementation [5]. In contrast, availability
of log data for post-mission analysis is the focus of this project. Therefore, it was imperative
that the protocol be designed assuming a requirement for availability rather than integrity
of log data. This chapter provides background information on topics that are critical to the
protocol’s design and verification. The topics to be covered include multi-vehicle UVSs,
distributed ledger technology (DLT), block chain, the Paxos family of consensus protocols,
and Monterey Phoenix.
2.1 Distributed Multi-Vehicle Autonomous Systems
To establish context, a clear definition for distributed, autonomous, multi-vehicle UVS is
required. Once defined, we will examine the unique design challenges that accompany these
types of systems.
2.1.1 Definition
Distributed, autonomous, multi-vehicle UVSs have three major design characteristics:
1. They are decentralized (distributed), which means that they do not have a central
vehicle through which all data is passed. Due to the nature of their operations, the
utilization of protocols that enable the distribution of data helps to ensure resiliency
in the event that one or more vehicles is lost. Since the system is distributed, the
vehicles in the system must communicate with each other to share log and event data.
2. They have autonomy (autonomous) and situational awareness at the individual vehicle
level. Each vehicle collects and interprets its own data, determines its own courses of
action, and communicates with other vehicles as required. In this context, vehicles are
5
required to communicate with other vehicles to share generated log and event data.
3. Multiple vehicles operate simultaneously within the system. These vehicles can be
watercraft, aircraft, spacecraft, or landcraft. The fact that numerous vehicles exist
in the system can create specific challenges and benefits. This project addresses the
following possible challenges: vehicle destruction, lossy or noisy communication,
and disconnection from the UVS.
When designing software protocols for these systems, it is mandatory to keep the aforemen-
tioned characteristics at the core of the design process.
2.1.2 Project Background
For this project, the target system is a swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These
aerial vehicles are not controlled by a human operator and they are expected to be exposed
to conditions that may lead to one or more UAVs being lost or destroyed. In this project,
we assume that the UAS are not be able to communicate with the base while engaged
in a mission. Given that these UAVs are exposed to the aforementioned conditions, the
UAS needs to be resilient enough to ensure that data survives the destruction of individual
members of the swarm. Furthermore, the target UAS will often be expected to engage in
periods of disjoint operation. This means that some or all UAVs are called upon to detach
from the swarm and operate independently or in smaller groups. Afterwards, the separated
UAVs will re-assimilate back into the swarm from which they detached. Hence, this type
of system is expected to experience disruptions due to packet loss and disconnection. A
requirement of this project is to define the specific process bywhich aUAVs assimilates back
into the swarm. Additionally, a swarm is expected to conduct operations that experience
high vehicle loss. That means that UAVs may crash or be shot down during a mission. This
type of scenario is a requirement of the research project and is accounted for by the protocol
that was designed.
2.2 Distributed Ledger Technologies
2.2.1 Purpose of Distributed Ledgers
First created in the late 1970s,DLTs are a formof data storage technology that are specifically
designed to facilitate the storage of pertinent information in a decentralized and duplicative
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manner [6]. Decentralized and duplicative storage prevents data from being destroyed or
modified easily. In fact, the system would require that the data be destroyed or modified on
all the members of the distributed system for it to be successfully removed or modified in
the system. In contrast, information in a centralized system can be destroyed or modified by
targeting the central node. Due to their ability to decentralize information, DLT can provide
great benefit in the form of increased availability of the data stored in the system, which will
become apparent in Chapters 3 and 4. Generally, distributed ledgers exhibit some or all of
the following characteristics: transparency, distribution, anonymity, and immutability [7].
Since this research project focuses on availability, the property of distribution is the only
characteristic for which background information is necessary. Transparency, anonymity and
immutability are not considered, as the benefits they may provide are out of the scope of
this work.
2.2.2 Characteristics of a Distributed Ledger
A core feature of DLT is the concept of distribution of information across the system. The
idea is clearly identified as a core concept by the use of the word “distributed” in the name
“distributed ledger technologies.” In the context of DLT design, the idea of distribution
means that all nodes in a distributed ledger store all of the information contained in that
ledger. This method of storing data helps to ensure that the property of availability is
maintained. By distributing stored data over multiple ledger nodes, a malicious actor would
need to destroy ledger data on all of the nodes to successfully deny availability of the
data. In Figure 2.1, the availability provided by a distributed system is illustrated. In this
scenario, one node in the system has been destroyed and the other four nodes in the system
are intact. Since all five nodes keep a copy of all pertinent information stored in the system,
the information survives the destruction of location number four. In contrast, Figure 2.2
depicts a scenario where information is stored in a centralized manner. When Location 1 is
destroyed, all information contained in Location 1 perishes.
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Figure 2.1. In the depicted distributed ledger scenario, one of the storage
locations is destroyed, but since the data is replicated in the other 4 locations
it survives.
Figure 2.2. With a centralized ledger system, if a single point of storage were
to be destroyed, all data would be lost.
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2.3 Block Chain
Perhaps the most well-known DLT form, a block chain is a chain of blocks containing
data that are linked in an agreed upon sequence [8]. Recently, block chain technologies
have been associated with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, but practical applications extend
beyond finance and currencies [9].
In a typical block chain, the chain structure is used to prevent the removal or modification of
data in the chain. For this project, reordering of data is necessary in some cases, so facilitating
the storage and reordering of data becomes the primary objective. In block chains, the chain
structure is designed to prevent the modification of data by cryptographically linking a
block to the block directly preceding it. The linking of a block to its preceding block is
accomplished by hashing the combination of the preceding block’s chain hash and the
current block’s block hash to generate the current block’s chain hash. By storing blocks in a
linked chain, no block in the chain can be removed or modified without altering the hashes
of all subsequent blocks on the chain. We depict the concept of linking in Figure 2.3, which
is explained as follows:
• Simple Chain - This chain is an unaltered block chain. It contains four blocks where
each block is linked to the previous block by incorporation of the previous block’s
chain hash in the block hash. Block 3 is linked to Block 2, Block 2 is linked to Block
1, and Block 1 is linked to Block 0. This chain will be used for comparison to the
other two chains in the figure.
• Reordering of Block 1 and Block 2 - In this example, the order of Block 1 and Block 2
is changed. When comparing the resulting chain to the Simple Chain we can see that
the chain hashes for Blocks 1, 2, and 3 are different while the chain hash for Block 0
is not. Since the order was changed starting at Block 1, all subsequent chain hashes
for the two chains will be different.
• Removal of Block 1 - In this scenario, Block one has been removed from the chain.
When comparing this chain to the Simple Chain, we can see that the chain hashes
are different for Blocks 2 and 3 but unaffected for Block 0. The removal of a block
evidently alters all subsequent chain hashes in the block chain.
The examples in Figure 2.3 demonstrate two fundamental characteristics of block chains:
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1. If blocks are reordered, the chain hash for the reordered blocks and all subsequent
blocks is altered.
2. If a block is removed, the chain hash for all subsequent blocks is altered.
Figure 2.3. This example illustrate how block chains prevent undetected
modification of or deletion of data using the MD-5 hashing algorithm [10]
to generate block and chain hashes
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2.4 Consensus
Consensus is defined as “the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned” [11]. We
define our consensus mechanism as the method by which the newest block chain is accepted
by the majority of computers online. For this project, establishing consensus becomes a
challenging problem, as it is impossible to guarantee that nodes in the system will always
be available to participate in the consensus process. Other block chain technologies, like
Bitcoin, prune data from their chains to gain consensus [9]. That type of consensus will
not work in our system, however. Here, we cannot assume that the majority of nodes are
connected to the system, so we based our DLP on a consensus protocol called Paxos and
proof-of-trust validation.
2.4.1 Proof-of-Trust
Proof-of-trust can mean multiple things in the context of distributed systems. Therefore, to
add clarity for this project, it is defined as follows: Proof-of-Trust means that for a node to
participate in the consensus process, it must be a trusted node. Therefore, the node must
be able to demonstrate that it is a trusted node. For this research project the demonstration
is based upon authentication material being loaded onto the node prior to its deployment
on a mission. This can be achieved through the use of encrypted and signed messages. For
the sake of this project, there is an assumption that proof-of-trust in the system will be
implemented by the underlying UVS rather than within the DLP. The UVS will use secure
communications and keys for the ledger protocol will be installed on each UV prior to the
mission.
2.4.2 Paxos
Paxos is a consensus protocol that enables distributed systems that experience network
message losses to eventually reach consensus [12]. The protocol does not guarantee the
property of unanimity, which means it cannot guarantee total consensus at any given time.
Rather, it ensures that the system makes progress towards consensus as time goes by [12].
Given Paxos’ complexity, we will break it down into its three basic components, and those
components will be described in more detail. These three components are choosing a value,
learning a chosen value, and progress [12].
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Before describing the components, we must note the three roles that nodes in a Paxos-like
system perform. First, there is the role of proposer. This role involves sending requests to
add information to the distributed system’s chain of information. The second role is that
of the acceptor. Acceptors as a group determine whether or not to accept the proposals
broadcast by the proposers. Last, the learners are those that hear accepted proposals and
commit that information to their systems. In most Paxos implementations, all nodes perform
multiple roles simultaneously [12].
The first step of the Paxos algorithm is choosing a value. For Paxos, the value is chosen
in two separate phases. In the first phase a proposer generates a proposal request with an
associated number, which we will call =. This = is a unique number that can only be used
once. After generating the proposal request, the proposer then broadcasts its request to the
acceptors. If the acceptor has not received a proposal request with a number greater than =,
then it will respond to the request with an approval. If the acceptor has received a request
with a number greater than =, then it will not approve. If a value is approved by a majority
of acceptors, then the proposer sends an accept request to each of those acceptors. Once
an acceptor receives this request, the proposal is accepted, so long as the acceptor has not
agreed to accept a proposal with a higher =.
The second step of Paxos is learning a chosen value. To learn a chosen value, the proposer
has to know that the majority of acceptors have accepted the proposed value. This can
be implemented in numerous ways and is not strictly defined in the Paxos algorithm. The
core idea behind this step is that all nodes in the distributed system must have a method of
discovering what values have been chosen for commitment to the system.
The progress step of Paxos means that, as time continues, the distributed system makes
progress towards consensus. This does not guarantee that consensus will be reached at any
given time, but rather that progress will not stop being made.
Finally, it is important to recognize that Paxos is a family of algorithms. In this project, we
base our algorithm on Paxos, but we must also make protocol-specific adjustments to assure
that Paxos works on our target system. In particular, Paxos algorithms are adept at solving
problems in systems that have network reliability problems, but they were not necessarily
developed to solve problems with UASs. In this project, we will craft our implementation
of the Paxos algorithms to address the lack of communications associated with disjoint
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operations, and to address the possibility that numerous nodes (i.e., small groups of nodes)
in the system may be permanently lost or destroyed.
2.5 Monterey Phoenix
A core part of this project was to ensure the behavioral correctness of our DLP. To do
this, we utilized a behavioral modeling and analysis tool called MP [3]. Dating back to the
early 1990s, MP is a Navy-developed formal language and approach for modeling behaviors
of systems, software, hardware, people, and organizations, and their dependencies on one
another and the environment [3]. This tool was instrumental in providing verification of the
behavioral correctness of our DLP. Behavioral modeling tools like MP are used to prove
the correctness of software algorithms. To prove correctness, an algorithm is converted to
the MPs grammar. Once converted, the algorithm is run through an exhaustive trace.
The results from the trace can then be examined to identify unintended behavior. To provide
background on MP, the following information is discussed: terminology, MP as a behavior
modeling tool, MP functionality, and the types of Lightweight Proofs that can be provided
by MP. A basic example of MP in use is also provided.
2.5.1 Terminology
This section introduces a number of teletyped terms. These terms are defined as follows:
• Correctness - A Boolean characterization of whether or not the execution results
match the intent of the designer. [13]
• Emergent Behavior - Patterns of behavior that occur when an algorithm is run
through an exhaustive trace.
• Exhaustive trace - A “brute force” trace methodology that looks at all possible
scenarios.
• Trace(s) - Execution of one or more instances of an algorithm.
2.5.2 MP as a Behavior Modeling Tool
The home page of MP states that “MP is used to describe operational processes, business
processes, and system or software architectures for behavior, and can support behavior
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descriptions from a mission level down to a detailed design level” [14]. Stated differently,
MP is intended to describe and identify emergent behavior in an algorithm.
For this project, the algorithm that was verified was our DLP. By modeling the behavior of
the algorithm, we can perform two critical checks: identify logical bugs and demonstrate
the correctness of the algorithm. Using MP allows us to create models of an algorithm
and to use those models to identify unexpected behavior. These types of models can be
useful at an early stage of system or software development to ensure that a flawed algorithm
is not implemented. Additionally, design details can be driven by examples of unintended
behavior discovered while modeling an algorithm.
2.5.3 Functionality
MP provides a lightweight proof by performing an exhaustive trace of a process [14].
Essentially, a set of rules are written to describe the essence of an algorithm at an abstract
level. These rules are utilized to better model the behaviors and interactions between
abstracted modules in the algorithm used to describe the system’s behavior. Due to its
exhaustive trace methodology, MP must be appropriately abstracted to prevent the
possibility of a combinatoric explosion leading to a situation where the resources necessary
to build and analyze a model exceed the available hardware and software resources of the
system on which it is running.
2.5.4 Lightweight Proofs
When attempting to conduct proofs with MP, it must be understood what it is possible to
prove with MP. The following properties are true of MP [14]:
1. MPmethodologies align with the assertion made in the small scope hypothesis, which
states that most logical bugs can be demonstrated on small counterexamples. In the
context of MP, small counterexamples means that MP does not have to trace every
possible scenario to be effective. In fact, the number of loop iterations must be limited
in cases where the loop may run an infinite number of times. MP limits iterations of
loops to a scope of five.
2. MP conducts lightweight proofs that exhaustively trace all possible scenarios.
Essentially, proof relies on the notion that if one identifies and analyzes all possible
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scenarios and finds no unintended behavior, then it can be concluded that an algorithm
works as intended.
3. MP is a useful tool for verifying that no easily apparent bugs exist in the algorithm
being examined.
4. MP does not provide formal mathematical methods of proving an algorithm, so it
cannot be definitively determined that a model is mathematically correct.
5. MP is not able to prove the correctness of the algorithm’s implementation. Many
implementation-specific details can cause an algorithm to work incorrectly, so an
assumption must be made that an algorithm’s implementation will not violate the
designer’s intent.
2.5.5 Example : Unreliable Message Flow
To provide clarity on how MP works, we examine an unreliable message flow example.
This example can be found in the MP Github repository [15]. The two-step process for an
unreliable network flow is:
1. Sender sends message.
2. Receiver either receives message or does not receive message.
In this example, the unreliable network problem has been abstracted and represented as a
two step process. In this process, we assume that when a message is sent, there are no issues
sending the message. The only possible thing that the sender can do is send a message. On
the receiving end, we assume that one of two things can happen: the receiver can either
receive the message or not receive the message. We are not looking at any details pertaining
to the message contents as that would be too granular for the level of abstraction in this
example.
The MP code for the unreliable message flow follows:
• MP Code - SCHEMA unreliable_message_flow
• Description - This line of code declares the MP schema with the name unreli-
able_message_flow and is the equivalent of giving the program a title.
• MP Code - ROOT Sender: (* send *);
• Description - This statement declares a root-level event called “Sender”. There is only
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one instance of a particular root-level event in each trace. The asterisks surrounding
send are what lets us know that the event can occur from zero to an infinite number
of times.
• MP Code - ROOT Receiver: (* (receive | does_not_receive) *);
• Description - This statement declares a root-level event called “Receiver”. Since it
is a root-level event, there is only one instance of “Receiver”. The associated events,
receive and does_not_receive, can occur from zero to an infinite number of times.
• MP Code -
COORDINATE $x: send FROM Sender,
$y: (receive | does_not_receive) FROM Receiver
• Description - These statements constitute a rule that forces the Sender to send a
message before a Receiver can receive a message. The “COORDINATE” statement
is used to set $x to the send event from the Sender. The $y is set to the receive or does
not receive conditional.
• MP Code - DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; OD;
• Description - This “DO ADD” statement is used to create a relationship between the
$x and $y variables. The word “PRECEDES” makes the relationship so that $x must
always precede $y.
2.6 Chapter Summary
To recap this chapter, the key concepts are summarized in this section. This chapter covered
distributed, autonomous, multi-vehicle systems and why they are the target systems for
this project. In this project, distributed ledgers provide the platform for increasing the
resilience of UASs. The type of distributed ledger utilized for this thesis is based on block
chain technology, which was described. For this project, the Paxos consensus protocol was
selected because of its ability to reach consensus in networks that experience significant
network losses. To complete the chapter,Monterey Phoenix (MP)was covered, as it provides
a methodology for determining the behavioral correctness of the Uniform Chain Protocol




Nickolas Carter and Peter Pommer, both master’s students in the Computer Science program
at NPS, co-authored this chapter for their respective theses. This chapter presents an inter-
mediate representation of their jointly developed protocol for a distributed, multi-vehicle
UVSs. They have examined the same problem from two different levels of abstraction: Nick
in a highly abstract model and Peter in a detailed implementation.
This chapter provides an in-depth description of the Uniform Chain Protocol (UCP). The
protocol is designed to ensure the post-mission reliability of UV data from a multi-vehicle
UVS that is subject to communications discontinuity and vehicle losses. When properly
implemented, the protocol exhibits the following characteristics:
• The protocol is distributed, event driven, and asynchronous. Each event handler is
implemented independently on every vehicle, and event handlers can be triggered
locally or in response to inter-vehicle messages.
• If a UV’s protocol event handlers are in an idle state, then all of its completed blocks
must be committed to its local block chain.
• No more than one copy of a particular blockwill be maintained on a UV at any time.
A block can exist within the locally-maintained block chain, within a “waiting to
be committed” data structure, or within a data structure associated with the reconcile
process.
• No block will exist within the block chain or any intermediate data structure that
was not generated by a participating UV. This characteristic is partially assured by
the UVS’s underlying cryptographic system, for now.
• In a fully connected system, all blocks will eventually be committed to all locally
maintained block chains (i.e., blockchains maintained by each UV).
• In a fully connected system where all agents have had the chance to reconcile block
chains with each other, one uniform block chain will emerge.
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3.1 Protocol Summary
The UCP is designed as a set of event handlers, which are executed on each UV in a given
UVS. When an event is generated, the UV upon which the event occurred will execute the
respective handler for that event. The objective of the UCP is to reliably distribute locally
generated information across the UVS to ensure its availability in the event of individual UV
losses. Shared data is stored in the form of blocks that are committed to block chains
maintained on each vehicle. Blocks are committed to the local block chains according
to an approval process. Following initiation of the proposal process, associated events will
be triggered according to the UCP until all locally maintained blocks have been committed
to the block chain, at which point the system will return to an idle state.
Over the course of a mission, one or more UVs may become disconnected from the UVS. If
they reconnect at a later time with UVs having block chains that differ, a reconciliation
process will eventually be initiated to unify the chains. The reconcile process may occur
numerous times throughout a mission. Once a mission is complete, the blocks contained in
the locally maintained block chains can be analyzed in support of mission analysis and
reconstruction. The main objective of UCP is to provide the UVS operators access to data
that was generated during a mission even if some data-generating UVs do not survive.
3.2 Definitions and Terminology
Throughout this chapter a number of words and phrases are highlighted with a teletype
font and are written in camel case in the algorithms. These words and phrases have specific
meaning in the context of the UCP and are defined as follows:
Agent - This is an individual vehicle in a UVS. For the duration of the chapter, this
term is synonymous with the acronym UV.
Agent ID - This is a unique identifier for each agent in the UVS.
Block - This is a data structure that stores data generated by an agent’s logging




Block chain - This is a locally maintained cryptographic chain that links each
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block in the system. A more detailed definition is provided in Section 3.4.
Block data - This term represents the generated data stored in a block. It contains
the following components:
– Agent ID of the agent that created the block.
– Event data
– Timestamp at the time the block was created.
Block Hash - This is the hash digest of block data, calculated as
= = H(=) (3.1)
where = is the block hash of block =, = is the block data contained in
block = andH is a cryptographic hash function.
Blocks to be committed deque - This is a double-ended queue data structure
that stores completed blocks that have not yet been committed to the block chain.
Blocks to be committed deque rlock - This is a re-entrant lock that facilitates
safe read and write operations on the blocks to be committed deque.
Chain Hash - This hash digest is stored in a block to cryptographically link it to the
previous block. The chain hash is calculated as
= = H(=−1 ‖ =) (3.2)
where H is a cryptographic hash function, = is the chain hash of the block
chain that includes block =, = is the block hash of block =, and =−1 is the
chain hash of the block immediately preceding block = in the block chain.
Chain rlock - This is a re-entrant lock that facilitates safe read and write operations
on the local chain.
Current block - This term references the block that is currently being examined
or manipulated within an event handler.
Current block being built - This is a data structure that stores locally generated
event data that has not yet been incorporated into a block. This data structure is
maintained until a “full” block can be generated for addition to the blocks to be
committed deque.
Event data - This term refers to loggable data generated by an agent for future
storage in the block chain.
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Inception block - This is the first block in the block chain. All agents in the
UVS share the same inception block.
Local chain - This term is used to reference an agent’s locally maintained block
chain within an event handler.
Local UVS - This term references the group of agents that are within communica-
tions range of the agent when a particular event handler is executed.
Mutual block - This refers to the top block in a mutual chain. The mutual
block’s chain hash provides verification that all blocks between this block and
the inception block are the same.
Mutual chain - This refers to a block chain segment from the inception block
to a mutual block that is identical for two or more agents.
Reconcile in progress - This is a boolean that facilitates atomic operation of the
reconcile process (Section 3.5.3). This boolean stops the agent from responding to
external requests.
Reconcile stack - This is a stack data structure that is used to temporarily store
blocks removed from the local chain during the reconcile process. These blocks
are recommitted to the local chain upon the completion of the reconcile process
by the Reconcile Finalize event handler.
Re-entrant lock, or rlock - This type of lock can be obtained multiple times by
a single thread. It must be released the same number of times that it was obtained
before another thread can obtain the lock.
Timer - A timer is a computational timing instrument with the following properties:
– The timer counts down from an arbitrary number to zero at a fixed rate.
– The timer can be paused and un-paused.
– The timer generates an event when its count reaches zero.
Top block hash - This is the block hash of the top block on the local chain
Top chain hash - This is the chain hash of the top block on the local chain
3.3 Assumptions
To appropriately scope this research project we made assumptions prior to the design of the
UCP:
• The target environment is a distributed system that contains multiple autonomous
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vehicles.
• The vehicles operate in a disjoint environment where agents frequently experience
network disconnection.
• The systemmay experience agent casualties. If a casualty occurs, we assume that the
casualty will result in the loss of all locally maintained data on that particular agent.
• We have access to a cryptographically secure hash algorithm, which means that we
will never encounter a hash collision.
• The platform that the UCP runs on will provide encryption and digital signature
services for all network communications and all generated event data. In particular,
we assume for now that the underlying cryptographic implementation ensures the
authenticity and confidentiality of all data with which the protocol works.
• Byzantine failures are not possible, and all messages are generated and sent in good
faith.
3.4 Block Chain Data Structure
In UCP, a block chain data structure is used to ensure that event data is stored in a
consistent manner across the UVS. In this section, we describe how this structure is imple-
mented in a way that helps the system reach consensus. By linking data using cryptographic
hashes, a block chain can guarantee that if two UVs share the same chain hash in a
block, then they share a mutual chain from that block down to the inception block.
In this section, we examine the block chain structure and identify the characteristics that
help the UVS attain consensus. The block chain structure is shown in Figure 3.1.
3.4.1 Inception Block
In the UCP, we define inception as the “beginning of the chain.” The block chain con-
tains one inception block, which must be the first block in the block chain. The
inception block is depicted in Figure 3.1. It possesses the following properties:
• It is loaded onto each agent in the UVS prior to the commencement of operations.
• Each vehicle in the UVS has the exact same inception block.
• It is the only block in the block chain that is created before any event data is
generated.
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Figure 3.1. This figure is an illustration of the block chain data structure.
The inception block has the following components:
1. Block data - 0 - The data contained in this block is predefined. The UVS
administrator determines the data in 0. This data is represented with  (initial
data) in Figure 3.1.
2. Block hash - 0 - The block hash of the inception block is a hash of 0.
It is computed by the following equation:
0 = H(0) (3.3)
3. Chain hash - 0 - The block hash is utilized to create the chain hash. For the
inception block, and only the inception block, 0 is hashed to create 0
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according to the following equation:
0 = H(0) (3.4)
3.4.2 Subsequent Blocks
Each subsequent block in the UCP block chain has the same components which differ
slightly from the corresponding components of the inception block. Depicted as block
1, block =, and block = + 1 in Figure 3.1, these blocks include the following information:
1. Block data - = - This component is a concatenation of the block’s three data
fields:
(a) Agent ID - = - of the UV that generated the data.
(b) A timestamp of when the block was completed.
(c) Event data - = - in the block.
To ensure that no two blocks have the same block data, the Agent ID of the
agent that generated each block and the time at which it was generated are included
in the block data. The timestamp component is also used as a tiebreaker in the
Reconcile (Section 3.5.3) process. The block data is computed as follows:
= = (= ‖ )(= ‖ =) (3.5)
2. Block hash - = - This is the hash of the block data of block = (=) as
calculated by Equation 3.1
3. Chain hash -= - This is the hash of the chain hash of the preceding block con-
catenatedwith the block hash of the current block as calculated by Equation 3.2.
The collision resistance property of the cryptographic hash function ensures that if
two chain hashesmatch for a block = in two or more distinct local chains, then
a mutual chain exists from the inception block to block =.
3.5 High-Level Overview
To present UCP,we start with an abstract overview of the events and sequences that construct
the protocol. In Section 3.6 we provide an in-depth description of the event handlers that
formUCP. The abstracted components of UCPwill be referenced in italics for the remainder
23
of this chapter. These components are:Generate a Block, Commit a Block, Reconcile Phase
1, Reconcile Phase 2, Reconcile Phase 3, and Reconcile Finalize. Each of these components
provides functionality that integrates to form the UCP. This high level overview is depicted
in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. An abstracted version of UCP.
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3.5.1 Generate a Block
A requirement for this protocol is that it must provide a mechanism for adding data to the
system. In this component of the algorithm, data is received from an agent’s internal
system. The data is added to the current block being built. Once added the algo-
rithm determines whether or not the current block being built contains enough data
to commit to the rest of the UVS. The amount of data required to commit a block is
implementation specific. If the current block being built contains enough data, the
algorithm attempts to commit it by invoking the the Commit Block component of the proto-
col. Otherwise, the algorithm maintains the current block being built in its updated
form and waits for more data to be generated.
3.5.2 Commit Block
Once a full block has been generated and submitted for commit, it must be distributed
among agents in the system. To do this, this the Commit Block component initiates a vote
whereby the committing agent requests permission to commit a block to the local UVS
by broadcasting the textttblock hash and its current top chain hash. The agents in the
local UVS individually respond with either an approval or disapproval vote. If the received
top chain hashmatches the receiving agent’s top chain hash, then the vote shall be
for approval. Otherwise, the vote shall be for disapproval. If the majority of the votes are
for approval, then the block is broadcast to the UVS for commitment to each agent’s
respective block chain. If the majority of votes are not for approval, then the Reconcile
component is called.
3.5.3 Reconcile
The Reconcile process is initiated to bring an agent’s block chain back into agreement
with the local UVS. The process is split into four distinct phases. The first phase finds a
mutual chain with the local UVS. In the second and third phase, the protocol builds
upon the mutual chain that was established in phase one. In the final phase everything
left in the reconcile stack (i.e., all blocks that are not included in the extended mutual
chain) is committed to the block chain and broadcast to the local UVS for committing
to each agents block chains.
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Reconcile Phase 1
In Reconcile Phase 1 the agent removes blocks from its block chain until a mutual
chain is found. Reconcile Phase 1 takes the following steps:
1. Broadcast a request for votes. These votes are used to determine if the broadcasting
agent’s top chain hash is contained in the block chain of the agents that
received the request. After the vote has been conducted, move to step 2.
2. Tally the votes. If the majority of responses indicate that the top chain hash is
not included anywhere in their block chainss, move to step 3. If the majority of
responses indicate that their block chains include that top chain hash, then the
mutual chain upon which to build has been identified, and the agent can move on
to Reconcile Phase 2. If no votes were received, move on to Reconcile Finalize.
3. Remove the top block from the block chain, push it onto the reconcile stack,
and repeat step one.
Reconcile Phase 2
In the second and third phases, the protocol builds upon the mutual chain that was
established in Reconcile Phase 1. In Reconcile Phase 2, the agent performs the following
steps:
1. Broadcast a vote request to the local UVS for the block on top of the mutual
block. Receiving agents will respond with the block hash of the block that is on
top of the mutual block in their local block chains. When the vote is complete,
move to step 2.
2. Tally the votes. If no responses are received, proceed to Reconcile Finalize. If at least
one response is received, the block with the most votes is selected to be added to
the mutual chain. Proceed to Reconcile Phase 3 to acquire this block. If the the
majority response is that the top chain hash is the mutual block, proceed to
Reconcile Finalize.
Reconcile Phase 3
By the time Reconcile Phase 3 starts, the system has identified a block to add to the
mutual chain by its block hash, but may need to acquire the actual block. This process
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is conducted through the following steps:
1. Check the reconcile stack to see if the block to be added is present. Proceed to
step 2 if the block is present or step 3 if it is not.
2. Remove the block from the reconcile stack and go to step 4.
3. Broadcast a request for the selected block to the local UVS and wait for a response
carrying the requested block. If no response is received, proceed to Reconcile Final-
ize. If a response is received, go to step 4.
4. Commit the block to the block chain. The newly committed block is now con-
sidered the mutual block and the updated block chain is now considered the
mutual chain. Proceed to Reconcile Phase 2 to continue the building process.
Reconcile Finalize
In Reconcile Finalize, all of the blocks that were added to the reconcile stack are
committed to the block chain. The process for this component is as follows:
1. If the reconcile stack is empty, then theReconcile Finalize component terminates.
Otherwise, proceed to step 2.
2. Pop a block off of the reconcile stack and proceed to step 3.
3. Commit the block to the local block chain and broadcast a message to the local
UVS to commit the block. Repeat step 1.
3.6 Detailed Chain Protocol
Figure 3.3 shows the key for symbols used in subsequent diagrams referenced throughout
this section. Each event handler is represented using a separate figure. Figures consists of a
box with a dotted arrow to signify the entry point of the function. The box consists of the
function name, how the function was triggered, a short description of the event, and a list
of input data as arguments to that function. There are also network messages broadcast to
the local UVS which are represented by a cloud. Locks, which are locked and unlocked
to facilitate safe concurrency, are represented by a lock image. Blue parallelograms with
yellow arrows represent triggering of a local event in an agent. Ellipses represent execution
of atomic steps. Finally, diamonds represent conditional evaluations (i.e., true or false) with
event handling diverging to different branches based on the results.
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Each event handler is represented using a separate figure. In the figures, we identify how
the event is triggered, provide a short description of the event handler, list what data the
handler receives as input, and describe the operations performed within the handler.
While examining the protocol, keep in mind that these event handlers are running on each
agent in the system. Handlers are triggered by locally generated events, and in response to
received network messages as indicated.
Figure 3.3. Event handler diagram and symbol key for use throughout this
section.
Network Messages
Throughout this chapter there are types of networkmessages identified in the event handlers.
These messages are broadcast to the local UVS and handled according to their message
type. Likewise, the type of the message determines which event handler parses the message
and performs action based on the contents of the message. The message types are defined
in the algorithm code and diagrams.
3.6.1 Incorporation of Event Data into Blocks
Build Data Block Event
The Build Data Block event handler is triggered internally when a vehicle’s logging system
generates event data to be incorporated into the block chain. The purpose of this
event handler is to collect and store event data in the current block being built
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until enough event data has been generated for the current block being built to
be considered “full”. Once full it is added to the to the blocks to be committed deque
and aProcess Next DequeBlock event is triggered. The processing of this event is described
by Algorithm 1 and depicted graphically in Figure 3.4.
Algorithm 1 Build Data Block Event Handler
2DAA4=C;>2:.30C0 ← 2DAA4=C;>2:.30C0 + 4{4=C
if (8I42DAA4=C;>2: + (8I4<0G{4=C ≥ (8I4<0G;>2: then
Obtain blocksToBeCommittedDequeRLock
2DAA4=C;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ←H(2DAA4=C;>2:.30C0)
Push 2DAA4=C;>2: onto bottom of blocksToBeCommittedDeque




Figure 3.4. The Build Data Block event handler is invoked when the
system generates loggable data for incorporation into the block chain.
3.6.2 The Commit Process
Process Next Deque Block Event
The Process Next Deque Block event is triggered internally by multiple event handlers:
Build Data Block, Vote Timer Expiration, and Reconcile Finalize. The purpose of this
event handler is to initiate the voting process among the local UVS to add the first block
from the blocks to be committed deque to the block chain. The processing of this
event is described by Algorithm 2 and depicted graphically in Figure 3.5.
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Algorithm 2 Process Next Deque Block Event Handler
if reconcileLock is unlocked and votingTimer is not active then
Obtain the blocksToBeCommittedDequeRLock
if blocksToBeCommittedDeque is not empty then
Clear voteCount
{>C4>D=C [“~4B”] ← 1
Obtain the chainRLock
C>?ℎ08=0BℎC=8C80C8>=← C>?ℎ08=ℎ0Bℎ










Figure 3.5. The Process Next Deque Block event handler is initiated
internally by multiple event handlers to initiate the process by which a new
block is proposed for addition to the block chain.
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Receive Request Add Block Event
The Receive Request Add Block event is triggered externally by receipt of a message indi-
cating that another agent is requesting to add a block to the block chain. The triggering
message includes the block hash of the block that is being proposed and the requesting
agent’s top chain hash. If the local top chain hash matches the requesting agent’s
top chain hash, the event handler will generate and transmit an “approve” response for
the proposed block hash. Otherwise, it will generate and transmit a “disaprove” response.
The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 3 and is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.6.
Algorithm 3 Receive Request Add Block Event Handler
if not reconcileInProgress then
Obtain the chainRLock
1;>2:33'4B?>=B4.1;>2:0Bℎ← <4BB04.1;>2:0Bℎ









Figure 3.6. The Receive Request Add Block event handler is invoked
upon receipt of a proposal from another agent to add a block to the
block chain.
Receive Vote Add Block Event
The Receive Vote Add Block event is triggered externally when a response to a block add
request message is received from another agent. The purpose of this handler is to parse and
tally votes for a previously proposed addition. Because communication is broadcast to every
agent and because each agent executes the handler for every event, the agent receiving
the response must determine if the response was for it. If so, the agent will increment
internal vote tally counters; otherwise it will ignore the response. The processing of this
event is described by Algorithm 4 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.7.
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Algorithm 4 Receive Vote Add Block Event Handler
if {>C8=)8<4A is active and
<4BB04.1;>2:0Bℎ == 20=3830C4;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ then
if <4BB04.{>C4 == “0??A>{4” then
{>C4>D=C [“~4B”] += 1
else
{>C4>D=C [“=>”] += 1
end if
end if
Figure 3.7. The Receive Vote Add Block event handler is triggered upon
receipt of a vote for a previously proposed block addition and tallies “approve”
and “disapprove” votes for later use.
Vote Timer Expiration Event
The Vote Timer Expiration event is triggered internally when the vote timer expires.
(Recall that the vote timer was started by the Process Next Deque Block event handler.)
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The purpose of this event handler is to determine if the request to add a block was
“approved” or “disapproved” by a majority of the responding agents. Depending on the
voting results the agent will do one of three things:
1. Trigger a Reconcile Begin event if the majority of the votes were “disapprove”.
2. Commit the block to the local block chain, broadcast the block for other agents
to commit to their block chains, and trigger a Process Next Deque Block event if
a majority of the votes were “approve”.
3. Trigger a Process next Deque Block without committing the proposed block if the
block chain changed while the vote tally process was running.
The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 5 and is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.8.
Algorithm 5 Vote Timer Expiration Event Handler
if not reconcileInProgress then
if {>C4>D=C [“~4B”] > {>C4>D=C [“=>”] then
Obtain the blocksToBeCommittedDequeRLock
Obtain the chainRLock
if topChainHash == topChainHashAtInitiation then
0??A>{43;>2: ← 1;>2:B)>4><<8CC43. 5 A>=C
ℎ0Bℎ0C0 ← (C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ + 0??A>{43;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ)
0??A>{43;>2:.2ℎ08=0Bℎ←H(ℎ0Bℎ0C0)
2><<8C;>2:.1;>2: ← 0??A>{43;>2:
Commit 0??A>{43;>2: to the 1;>2:ℎ08=
Network send Commit Block
Remove 1;>2:B)>4><<8CC43. 5 A>=C









Figure 3.8. The Vote Timer Expiration event handler uses the results of
the block add vote to determine whether to commit the proposed block to
the block chain or trigger a Reconcile Begin event.
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Receive Commit Block Event
The Receive Commit Block event is triggered externally by receipt of a block add message
from another agent. The purpose of this event handler is to commit the received block to
the local block chain. The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 6 and is
depicted graphically in Figure 3.9.
Algorithm 6 Receive Commit Block Event Handler
if not reconcileInProgress then
Obtain the chainRLock
if <4BB04.1;>2: succeeds C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ then





Figure 3.9. The Receive Commit Block event handler can be triggered
by receipt of a block add message from another agent or locally by the
Vote Timer Expiration or Reconcile Finalize event handlers. This event
handler formally commits a block to the local block chain if appropriate.
3.6.3 Reconcile Process
The reconcile process is utilized to create consensus to ensure a mutual chain among the
local UVS as blocks are added. This also ensures that progress is made toward dispersing
event data to each agent in the system.
Reconcile Begin Event
The Reconcile Begin event is triggered internally by two event handlers: Vote Timer
Expiration and Receive Request Next in Sequence. This is the event handler that is
referenced when reconcile is triggered in the diagrams. The purpose of this event handler
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is to initiate the reconcile process. It also sets an internal Boolean variable, reconcile in
progress, that will inhibit the agent’s participation in other agents’ commit and reconcile
processes while the local block chain is in the process of being altered. The processing
of this event is described by Algorithm 7 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.10.
Algorithm 7 Reconcile Begin Event Handler
if not reconcileInProgress then
A42>=28;4=%A>A4BB← )AD4
Trigger Reconcile Phase 1 event
end if
Figure 3.10. The Reconcile Begin event handler is triggered by the Vote
Timer Expiration and Receive Request Next in Sequence events and
initiates the reconcile process.
40
with a majority of the local UVS.
TheReconcile Phase 1 event is triggered internally by two event handlers:Reconcile Begin
and Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration. It issues a request to the local UVS asking if
their block chains contain this agent’s top chain hash. The processing of this event
is described by Algorithm 8 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.11.
Algorithm 8 Reconcile Phase 1 Event Handler
Clear reconcileVoteCount
2ℎ08=>=C08=&D4A~.2ℎ08=0Bℎ← C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ
Network send Chain Contain Query
Start phaseOneTimer
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Reconcile Phase 1 Event
Per the high-level overview, the purpose of phase 1 is to remove blocks from the local 
block chain and store them in the reconcile stack until a mutual chain is found
Figure 3.11. The Reconcile Phase 1 event handler is triggered by the
Reconcile Begin and Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration event han-
dlers and initiates the process of identifying a mutual chain upon which
to build.
Receive Request Chain Contain Event
The Receive Request Chain Contain event is triggered externally by receipt of a chain
contain query message from another agent asking whether or not the local block chain
contains a particular chain hash. This event handler will respond the to the request with
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a “yes” if the local block chain contains the queried chain hash and “no” otherwise.
The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 10 and is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.13.
Algorithm 9 Receive Request Chain Contain Event Handler
if not reconcileInProgress then
2ℎ08=>=C08='4B?>=B4.2ℎ08=0Bℎ← <4BB04.2ℎ08=0Bℎ
Obtain the chainRLock









Figure 3.12. The Receive Request Chain Contain event handler is trig-
gered by receipt of a message from another agent asking whether or not a
particular chain hash is contained in the local block chain.
Receive Phase 1 Response Event
The Receive Phase 1 Response event is triggered externally by receipt of a message
responding to a chain contain query message. The purpose of this event handler is to collect
responses for use in determining whether or not the current block chain can be used
as a mutual chain upon which to build. The processing of this event is described by
Algorithm 10 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.13.
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Algorithm 10 Receive Phase 1 Response Event Handler
if ?ℎ0B4$=4)8<4A is active and <4BB04.2ℎ08=0Bℎ == C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ then
if <4BB04.{>C4 == “~4B” then
A42>=28;4+>C4>D=C [“~4B”] += 1
else
A42>=28;4+>C4>D=C [“=>”] += 1
end if
end if
Figure 3.13. The Receive Phase 1 Response event handler is triggered by the
receipt of a response to a Chain Contain Query message.
Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration Event
The Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration event is triggered internally upon expiration
of the phase one timer that was started by the Reconcile Phase 1 event handler. The
purpose of this event handler is to tally the chain contain response results. One of the
following courses of action will be initiated based on the results:
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1. If no responses were received, then the agent is not in communication with any other
agent and a Reconcile Finalize event is triggered.
2. If the majority of the responses are “no” then the top block in the agent’s local
block chain block chain is removed and added to the to reconcile stack,
and a Reconcile Phase 1 event is triggered.
3. If the majority of the responses are “yes” then the mutual chain has been found
and a Reconcile Phase 2 event is triggered.
The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 11 and is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.14.
Algorithm 11 Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration Event Handler
if A42>=28;4+>C4>D=C [“~4B”] + A42>=28;4+>C4>D=C [“=>”] == 0 then
Trigger Reconcile Finalize event
else if A42>=28;4+>C4>D=C [“~4B”] < A42>=28;4+>C4>D=C [“=>”] then
C4<? ← ;>20;ℎ08=.?>?()
A42>=28;4(C02:.?DBℎ(C4<?)
Trigger Reconcile Phase 1 event
else
Trigger Reconcile Phase 2 event
end if
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Figure 3.14. Upon expiration of the Reconcile Phase 1 Timer, responses
are tallied to determine whether or not a mutual chain has been identified.
Reconcile Phase 2 Event
The Reconcile Phase 2 event is triggered by the Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration
event handler when a mutual chain has been identified. Recall from Section 3.5.3 that
phase 2 is where the agent builds upon the mutual chain to align its local chain with
that of the local UVS. In phase 2, agents within the local UVS provide the reconciling
agent with blocks from their block chains to establish consensus.
The event handlers associated with phase 2 rely on a dictionary or map data structure
associating a counter and time stamp with each candidate block hash rather than a simple
“yes”/“no” counter. This data structure facilitates determination of the correct block to add
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to the block chain given multiple options and allows for the use of the time stamp as a
tiebreaker (i.e., the block with the oldest time stamp is chosen).
This event handler is triggered internally after the agent has found a mutual chain with
the majority of the local UVS The purpose of this event handler is to send the phase 2
request to the local UVS and clear counters for the expected responses. The broadcast
request asks each agent in the local UVS to reply with the block hash of its block
that succeeds the requesting agent’s top chain hash. The processing of this event is
described by Algorithm 12 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.15.





Network send Chain Hash Successor Query
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Figure 3.15. The Reconcile Phase 2 event handler is initiated by the
Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration event handler to initiate the process
of adding blocks to the mutual chain.
Receive Request Next in Sequence Event
The Receive Request Next in Sequence event is triggered externally by receipt of a chain
Hash successor query message by which another agent is requesting the block hash of
the block immediately succeeding the requesting agent’s local top chain hash. The
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purpose of this event handler is to search the local block chain for the requested chain
hash and to respond accordingly based on whether or not it is found.
This event handler has the additional task of initiating the Reconcile Begin process if the
requested chain hashwas not found in the block chain. If this happens then it indicates
that this agent’s local block chain has diverged from the majority mutual chain and
needs to be reconciled.
The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 13 and is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.16.
Algorithm 13 Receive Request Next in Sequence Event Handler
if not A42>=28;4=%A>A4BB then
Obtain the 2ℎ08='!>2:
if 1;>2:ℎ08= contains <4BB04.2ℎ08=0Bℎ then
=4GC=(4@D4=24'4B?>=B4.2ℎ08=0Bℎ← <4BB04.2ℎ08=0Bℎ
if <4BB04.2ℎ08=0Bℎ == C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ then
=4GC=(4@D4=24'4B?>=B4.1;>2: ← “Is Top Of Chain”
=4GC=(4@D4=24'4B?>=B4.C8<4BC0<? ← 1;>2:ℎ08=.C>?.C8<4BC0<?
else




Network send Next in Sequence Response
else





Figure 3.16. The Receive Request Next in Sequence event handler is
triggered by receipt of a chain hash successor query from another agent.
It responds to the query accordingly and initiates a local reconcile process
as required.
Receive Response Next in Sequence Event Handler
The Receive Response Next in Sequence event is triggered externally by receipt of a
message responding to a previously transmitted chain hash successor query. It maintains
the vote counter and dictionary objects as responses are received so that the correct block
can be selected for addition to the mutual chain. The processing of this event is described
by Algorithm 14 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.17.
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Algorithm 14 Receive Response Next in Sequence Event Handler
if ?ℎ0B4)|>)8<4A is active and <4BB04.2ℎ08=0Bℎ == C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ then









Figure 3.17. The Receive Response Next in Sequence event handler
is triggered by receipt of a message responding to a previously transmit-
ted chain hash successor query and maintains counters facilitating correct
extension mutual chain.
Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration Event
The Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration event is triggered upon expiration of the phase
2 timer that was started by the Reconcile Phase 2 event handler. Upon being triggered,
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this event handler chooses the majority response from the dictionary. In the case of a tie, the
response with the oldest time stamp is chosen. If no responses were received or the majority
response was the special “Is Top of Chain” indicator, then the majority mutual chain has
been completed and a Reconcile Finalize event is triggered. Otherwise, a Reconcile Phase
3 event is triggered to acquire a copy of the block associated with the majority response.
The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 15 and is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.18.
Algorithm 15 Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration Event Handler
if A42>=28;4'4B?>=B4>D=C == 0;B4 then
Trigger Reconcile Finalize event
else
if <0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4 from A42>=28;4'4B?>=B482C8>=0A~ is a tie then
<0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4 ← 1;>2:0Bℎ with oldest C8<4BC0<?
else
<0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4 ← majorityResponse blockHash
end if
if <0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4 == “Is Top of Chain” then
Trigger Reconcile Finalize event
else
<0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4;>2:0Bℎ← <0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4




Figure 3.18. The Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration event is triggered
upon expiration of the phase 2 timer. It determines the block hash as-
sociated with the local majority mutual chain.
Reconcile Phase 3 Event
The Reconcile Phase 3 event is triggered internally by the Reconcile Phase 2 Timer
Expiration event handler once it has identified the block hash of the next block to be
added to the block chain. Recall that the point of phase 3 is to obtain the actual block
associated with the majority block hash. The event handler first searches for the block
hash in the reconcile stack (where it may be located if was previously committed
to the block chain but was removed earlier in the reconcile process). If the block is
54
available locally, it is removed from the reconcile stack and committed to the block
chain. If not, a request for the block is broadcast to the local UVS and the phase 3
timer is started. The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 16 and is depicted
graphically in Figure 3.19.
Algorithm 16 Reconcile Phase 3 Event Handler
if <0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4;>2:0Bℎ is in the A42>=28;4(C02: then
1;>2: ← A42>=28;4(C02:.A4<>{4(<0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4;>2:0Bℎ)
Obtain the 2ℎ08='!>2:
ℎ0Bℎ0C0 ← (C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ + 1;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ)
1;>2:.2ℎ08=0Bℎ←H(ℎ0Bℎ0C0)





Network send Request for Block
end if
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Figure 3.19. The Reconcile Phase 3 event is triggered internally by the
Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration event handler and is responsible for
initiating request for the block associated with the majority block hash.
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Receive Request Block for Hash Event
The Receive Request Block for Hash event is triggered externally when a request is
received from another agent for the block associated with a particular block hash. The
purpose of this event handler is to search the local block chain for the requested block
and to send it to the requesting agent if it is found. The processing of this event is described
by Algorithm 17 and is depicted graphically in Figure 3.20.
Algorithm 17 Receive Request Block for Hash Event Handler
if not A42>=28;4=%A>A4BB then
Obtain the 2ℎ08='!>2:
if <4BB04.1;>2:0Bℎ in 1;>2:ℎ08= then
1;>2: ← 1;>2:ℎ08=.2>?~(<4BB04.1;>2:0Bℎ)





Figure 3.20. The Receive Request Block for Hash event handler is trig-
gered by an external request for a block associated with a particular block
hash. The agent sends block to the requesting agent if it is present in
the local block chain.
Receive Response Block for Hash Event
The Receive Response Block for Hash event is triggered externally when a response to
a block is received in response for a previously broadcast request for block is received.
The purpose of this event handler is two-fold. First, it must determine whether or not the
received block was in response to a request made by this agent, and if so, commit it to
the block chain. Second, it manages the phase 3 timer by pausing and restarting it
or terminating it. The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 18 and depicted
graphically in Figure 3.21.
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Algorithm 18 Receive Response Block for Hash Event
if ?ℎ0B4)ℎA44)8<4A is active then
Pause ?ℎ0B4)ℎA44)8<4A
if <4BB04.1;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ == <0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4;>2:0Bℎ then
Stop ?ℎ0B4)ℎA44)8<4A
Obtain the 2ℎ08='!>2:
ℎ0Bℎ0C0 ← (C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ + <4BB04.1;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ)
<4BB04.1;>2:.2ℎ08=0Bℎ←H(ℎ0Bℎ0C0)
Commit <4BB04.1;>2: to the 1;>2:ℎ08=
Release the 2ℎ08='!>2:
<0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4;>2:0Bℎ← #D;;






Figure 3.21. The Receive Response Block for Hash event handler is
triggered by receipt of a response to a previously transmitted request for
block. If the contained block is the one that was requested, it is added to
the local block chain.
Reconcile Phase 3 Timer Expiration Event
The Reconcile Phase 3 Timer Expiration event is triggered upon expiration of the phase 
3 timer that was started by the Reconcile Phase 3 event handler. If a valid response is 
received, the phase 3 timer is terminated by the Receive Response Block for Hash event 
handler, so the phase 3 timer will only expire if no valid responses were received. This 
event handler, therefore, simply concludes the reconcile process by triggering a Reconcile 
Finalize event. The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 19 and is depicted 
graphically in Figure 3.22.
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Algorithm 19 Reconcile Phase 3 Timer Expiration Event Handler
<0 9>A8C~'4B?>=B4;>2:0Bℎ← #D;;
Trigger Reconcile Finalize event
Figure 3.22. The Reconcile Phase 3 Timer Expiration event handler is
only triggered when no valid responses are received to a request for block
message. When this occurs, Reconcile Phase 3 is terminated by triggering
a Reconcile Finalize event.
Reconcile Finalize Event
The Reconcile Finalize event is triggered internally by the Reconcile Phase 1 Timer
Expiration event handler, the Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration event handler, or the
Reconcile Phase 3 Timer Expiration event handler. Its purpose is to recommit blocks
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remaining in the reconcile stack after completion of the reconcile process back to the
local block chain. In addition to recommitting them to the local block chain, the event
handler broadcasts them to the local UVS for other agents so that they can be added to
their respective block chains. Once the reconcile stack has been cleared, the event
handler unsets the reconcile in progress flag and triggers a Process Next Deque
Block so that any blocks that have been generated during the reconcile process can be dealt
with. The processing of this event is described by Algorithm 20 and depicted graphically in
Figure 3.23.
Algorithm 20 Reconcile Finalize Event Handler
Obtain the 2ℎ08='!>2:
while A42>=28;4(C02: not empty do
2><<8C;>2: ← A42>=28;4(C02:.?>?()
ℎ0Bℎ0C0 ← (C>?ℎ08=0Bℎ + 2><<8C;>2:.1;>2:0Bℎ)
2><<8C;>2:.2ℎ08=0Bℎ←H(ℎ0Bℎ0C0)
Commit 2><<8C;>2: to ;>20;ℎ08=




Trigger Process Next Deque Block event
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Figure 3.23. The Reconcile Finalize event handler can triggered by any of
the reconcile phase timer expiration events or when the maximum local
UVS mutual chain has been generated to recommit blocks remaining in
the reconcile stack to the blockchain.
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3.7 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, we presented the novel Uniform Chain Protocol (UCP). We started the
chapter by presenting a brief summary of the protocol in Section 3.1. Next, we introduced
and defined the terminology that we used in the context of the UCP. After defining the
terminology, we asserted all of the assumptions that we made in designing the UCP.
Next, we describeded the block chain data structure that we implemented in the UCP
and provided a high-level overview of the UCP. Finally, we described the 20 events that
comprise the UCP and provided detailed the event-handling algorithms for each.
In Chapter 4 of the Pommer thesis, an exemplar implementation of theUCP on theAdvanced
Robotic Systems Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL) multi-UAV system is described. In
Chapter 4 of the Carter thesis, the UCP is examined for correctness utilizing the Monterey




In this Chapter, we describe howMPwas used to verify the correctness of the UCP presented
in Chapter 3. To verify that UCP is correct, we must prove the six protocol characteristics
we asserted in Chapter 3 are true:
1. The protocol is distributed, event driven, and asynchronous. Each event handler is
implemented independently on every vehicle, and event handlers can be triggered
locally or in response to inter-vehicle messages.
2. If a UV’s protocol event handlers are in an idle state, then all of its completed blocks
must be committed to its local block chain.
3. No more than one copy of a particular blockwill be maintained on a UV at any time.
A block can exist within the locally-maintained block chain, within a “waiting to
be committed” data structure, or within a data structure associated with the reconcile
process.
4. No block will exist within the block chain or any intermediate data structure that
was not generated by a participating UV. This characteristic is partially assured by
the UVS’s underlying cryptographic system, for now.
5. In a fully connected system, all blocks will eventually be committed to all locally
maintained block chains, i.e., block chains maintained by each UV.
6. In a fully connected system where all agents have had the chance to reconcile block
chains with each other, one uniform block chain will emerge.
In this list, four of the six characteristics can be verified with MP. Characteristic 4 can be
partially verified by MP, but not entirely verified. MP cannot verify that the underlying
vehicle system is secure, so we cannot verify that externally generated invalid blocks do not
exist in the system. However, MP can verify that blocks do not sporadically appear in the
system. This is, however, a trivial verification that is demonstrated by the fact that all blocks
in the system are created by the Build Data Block event described in Chapter 3.6.1. Correct
implementation of this event handler, therefore, will preclude the generation of invalid
blocks from within the system. Characteristic 1 relies on the specific implementation of the
UCP, so it cannot be verified with MP. These two characteristics, however, must hold true
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in the implementation for UCP to work as intended. To verify the other four characteristics,
this chapter is divided into a consensus section and a state section. The consensus section
will address the verification of Characteristics 3, 5, and 6. In the state section, Characteristic
2 will be verified.
For both sections, three parts are presented and discussed:
1. Abstraction - To scope themodel and prevent exhaustion of resources, we represented
the algorithm as an abstract version of UCP. Different abstractions used for the
consensus and state sections. In both cases, the abstractions directly map to UCP.
2. MP Code - Code is used in both sections to convert the respective abstract algorithm
to a model that MP can use to verify the algorithm.
3. Discussion - Finally, we discuss how the MP code verifies each of the characteristics
identified.
4.1 Consensus
In this section, we verify the correctness of the consensus process. The goal of our MP
model is to verify that the following statements, which were identified at the beginning of
the chapter, are true:
• No more than one copy of a particular blockwill be maintained on a UV at any time.
A block can exist within the locally-maintained block chain, within a “waiting to
be committed” data structure, or within a data structure associated with the reconcile
process.
• In a fully connected system, all blocks will eventually be committed to all locally
maintained block chains, i.e., block chains maintained by each UV.
• In a fully connected system where all agents have had the chance to reconcile block
chains with each other, one uniform block chain will emerge.
4.1.1 Abstraction
In this section, we break the abstraction process into components and behaviors. We first




The MP model that demonstrates correctness of the protocol can be represented with five
components and two data structures. The components are each abstractions of event handlers
in the Reconcile Process (Subsection 3.6.3) of UCP:
• Phase 1 Vote - This component is an abstraction of the three event handlers in the first
phase of reconcile. The three event handlers are Reconcile Phase 1, Receive Phase 1
Response, and Reconcile Phase 1 Timer Expiration. For the purpose of the model,
these three event handlers have to work exactly as intended in UCP. The purpose of
this component is to find a mutual chain.
• Phase 2 Vote - This component is an abstraction of the Reconcile Phase 2, Receive
Response Next in Sequence, and Reconcile Phase 2 Timer Expiration event han-
dlers. These three event handlers hold a vote that enables the protocol to build upon
a mutual chain.
• Check Reconcile Stack for Block - This component is an abstraction of a check
performed in the Reconcile Phase 3 event handler. This check verifies that when we
add a block to the chain that it is not contained in the reconcile stack.
• Phase 3 Request - This component requests for and adds the block that is selected
upon in the Phase 2 Vote to the block chain. This component is an abstraction of
Reconcile Phase 3, Receive Response Block for Hash, and the Reconcile Phase 3
Timer Expiration event handlers.
• Reconcile Finalize - This component is an abstraction of the Reconcile Finalize
event handler.
The two data structures for this model are:
• Reconcile Stack - This is the reconcile stack data structure defined in Sec-
tion 3.2 .
• Block Chain - This is the block chain data structure defined in Section 3.2.
Behaviors
Now that we have identified all of the components in our MP consensus model, we can
describe the behaviors of the abstract algorithm. The behaviors that the abstracted algorithm
must exhibit to accurately represent UCP follow:
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1. The abstracted algorithm starts with the Phase 1 Vote. This vote can have three
behaviors that were modeled with MP: no response, no approval, or approval.
(a) If no response is received, the algorithm goes directly to Reconcile Finalize.
(b) If the vote is not for approval, then the following three things happen:
i. The top block is removed from the block chain.
ii. The top block is placed on the reconcile stack.
iii. Phase 1 Vote is conducted again.
(c) If the vote is for approval, the process moves to Phase 2 Vote because a mutual
chain has been found.
2. The Phase 2 Vote is now conducted to build upon the mutual chain. This vote can
result in three possible outcomes that were modeled with MP: no response, top hash
found, or a block hash is received.
(a) If no response is received, the algorithm goes directly to Reconcile Finalize.
(b) If the majority response is that the top hash has been found, then the program
goes to Reconcile Finalize.
(c) If the majority response is a block hash, then the program proceeds to Check
Reconcile Stack for Block.
3. In the Check Reconcile Stack for Block component, the algorithm checks the
reconcile stack for the block hash selected in the Phase 2 Vote. This check
can result in two possible outcomes:
(a) If the block hash is present, the following behaviors are exhibited:
i. The block corresponding to the block hash is removed from the
reconcile stack.
ii. That block corresponding to the block hash is added to the top of the
block chain.
iii. The Phase 2 Vote is repeated.
(b) If theblock hash is not present, the algorithmproceeds to thePhase 3Request.
4. In the Phase 3 Request, the UV broadcasts a request for the UVS to send the block
that corresponds to the block hash selected in the Phase 2 Vote. This request can
result in two possible outcomes.
(a) If no response is received, the algorithm proceeds to Reconcile Finalize.
(b) If the block is received, the following happens:
i. The block is added to the top of the block chain.
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ii. The Phase 2 Vote is repeated.
5. If the reconcile stack is empty when theReconcile Finalize component is called,
then the consensus process has been completed. If it is not empty, the following
behavior is exhibited:
(a) A block is popped off the top of the reconcile stack and committed to the
chain. The algorithm proceeds to behavior 5.b.
(b) If the reconcile stack is empty, the algorithm proceeds to behavior 5.c. If
the reconcile stack is not empty, repeat behavior 5.a.
(c) When the reconcile stack is empty, the consensus process is complete.
6. Universal Behavior - This is not behavior of a specific component, but instead
addresses behavior that is true across all components in this abstracted model. The
following behaviors are universal:
(a) All pathways through the algorithm will terminate after Reconcile Finalize and
only after Reconcile Finalize.
(b) The program can only terminate if the reconcile stack is empty.
(c) The algorithm always starts at Phase 1 Vote.
The behavior identified in this section is depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. Abstracted version of the consensus process in UCP
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4.1.2 Monterey Phoenix Code
Following abstraction of the UCPs consensus process, we can convert the abstracted al-
gorithm into MP code. Below, we identify each segment of code as well as the behavior
it models.In the MP code there are internal and external events with similar names. An
example is Add_to_Chain_Top and Add_to_Chain_Top_. Although named similarly, they
are different events. Add_to_Chain_Top is used for internally generated additions to the
chain and Add_to_Chain_Top_ is used for externally generated additions to the chain. This
naming convention is used to distinguish other types of internal and external events. The
code for the consensus process is provided in Table 4.1:







2 ROOT RECONCILE: None
3 (+ Phase_1_Vote +); None
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Phase_1_Vote: (No_Response
Reconcile_Finalize | No |
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2.b - Top hash found, proceed toRec-
oncile Finalize
2.c -Receivedblock hash, proceed





3.a.iii - Block hash found in
reconcile stack, repeat Phase 2
Vote
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DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
1.b.i - Mutual chain not reached,







DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
3.a.ii - Block hash found in
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DO ADD $b PRECEDES $a; OD;
1.b.ii - Mutual chain not reached,









DO ADD $b PRECEDES $a; OD;
3.a.ii - Block hash found in







DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
5.a - Block popped from
reconcile stack
5.b - If reconcile stack not
empty, repeat 5.a
5.c - Reconcile stack is empty,
consensus complete
4.1.3 Discussion
In this section we analyze the results that were received when we compiled the model. The
full results from the compiled MP model are provided in Appendix A.3. Here we describe
how the results from the MP model satisfy the three statements we made at the beginning
of Section 4.1:
1. Statement - Nomore than one copy of a particular blockwill be maintained on a UV
at any time. A block can exist within the locally-maintained block chain, within
a “waiting to be committed” data structure, or within a data structure associated with
the reconcile process.
Analysis - To satisfy this statement, we must establish that the program does not
store a block in the chain more than once. In the analysis of the results provided by
MP, the model always checked to see the block being added to the chain was in the
reconcile stack. This check provides assurance that a block does not exist in the
block chain more than once. To further prove this statement, we will examine the
75
three structures that a block can be committed to the block chain from:
(a) Reconcile Stack - The only way that a block can get on the reconcile stack
is from the block chain. If two copies of a block do not exist in the block
chain, then two copies cannot be put on the reconcile stack.
(b) Local UVS - If a second copy of a block comes from the Local UVS, then the
check we identified prevents it from being saved to the block chain twice.
(c) Blocks to be committed deque - This structure is reserved only for new
blocks. By its nature, we cannot have a block committed from this structure
twice as it only performs the initial commit of a block.
By conducting this check, we have shown the algorithm prohibits all three vectors in
which a block may be added twice. Therefore, the statement is satisfied.
2. Statement - In a fully connected system, all blocks will eventually be committed to
all locally maintained block chains (i.e., the block chains maintained by each
UV).
Analysis - To satisfy this statement, we must establish that the program does not stop
running until all blocks are in the chain. In the analysis of the results provided by MP,
the program only terminated with an empty reconcile stack. The fact that the
program only terminated with an empty reconcile stack satisfies this statement.
3. Statement - In a fully connected system where all agents have had the chance to
reconcile block chains with each other, one uniform block chain will emerge.
Analysis - For this statement, fully connected cases exclude results where the model
traced the path of No_Response. By definition,No_Responsemeans that the program
is not fully connected. To satisfy this statement, we must establish that in fully
connected cases the following two-part sequence of events occurred:
(a) The program iterated through Phase 1 Vote until it found a mutual chain.
(b) The program iterated through a combination of Phase 2 Vote,Check Reconcile
Stack for Block, and Phase 3 Request until it found the top hash.
In the analysis of the results provided by MP, the fully connected cases always
completed the first part and then moved onto and completed the second part. The
completion of both parts, therefore, satisfies this statement.
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4.2 State
In this section, we verify the correctness of UCP’s state. The goal of our MP model is to
verify that the following statement is true:
1. If a UV’s protocol event handlers are in an idle state, then all of its completed blocks
must be committed to its local block chain.
4.2.1 Abstraction
For this section, we divide the abstraction process into components and behaviors. We first
identify the component and then we identify the behaviors they exhibit that are modeled
with MP.
Components
The MP model that demonstrates correctness of the protocol can be represented with five
internal components and three external components. These components are abstractions of
event handlers in the UCP. The internal components are:
1. Block Ready - This component is an abstraction of the Build Data Block event
handler in Section 3.6.1. This abstraction only represents the case where a full block
has been built and is ready to be committed to the block chain.
2. Hold Votes and Determine Approval - This component is an abstraction of the Pro-
cess Next Deque Block, andReceive Vote AddBlock event handlers in Section 3.6.2.
This component also represents a partial abstraction of the Vote Timer Expiration
event handler. The rest of the abstraction is in the next two components.
3. Verify Chain - This component represents another part of the abstraction for theVote
Timer Expiration event handler. This component is the abstraction of the part of the
handler where the chain is verified to be unaltered before a block is committed.
4. Commit Block to Chain - This component is the last part of the abstraction for
the Vote Timer Expiration event handler. This component represents the part of
the event handler where a block that has been approved is committed to the block
chain.
5. Reconcile - This component is an abstraction of the Reconcile Process in Sec-
tion 3.6.3. This component represents the entire Reconcile Process and all event
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handlers contained within it.
The external events are as follows:
1. Sufficient Data Generated - This component is an abstraction of the input provided
by the system running UCP. This component is utilized to represent scenarios where
enough data has been generated to build a full block.
2. ReceiveMessage to Commit Block - This component is an abstraction of theReceive
Commit Block event handler in Section 3.6.2.
3. Hear Hash on Top of Hash not in Chain - This component is an abstraction of the
Receive Request Next in Sequence event handler in Section 3.6.2. This component
is used to represent behavior that occurs when a vehicle hears a request for a block
on top of a block that it does not have.
Behaviors
Now thatwe have identified all of the components required in ourMPmodel, we can describe
the behaviors of the abstract algorithm. The behaviors that the abstracted algorithm must
exhibit to represent UCP are:
1. When Sufficient Data Generated is generated, the algorithm proceeds to call the
Block Ready component.
2. When Receive Message to Commit Block is generated, the algorithm will behave in
one of two ways:
(a) If the vehicle can commit the block, then the algorithm proceeds to theCommit
Block to Chain component.
(b) If the vehicle cannot commit the block, then the algorithm ignores the request.
3. When theHear Hash on Top of Hash not in Chain event is generated, the algorithm
will behave in one of two ways:
(a) If the algorithm is in a reconciling state, then the algorithm ignores the event.
(b) If the algorithm is not in a reconciling state, then the algorithm proceeds to the
Reconcile component.
4. The Block Ready component leads to one of two possible behaviors:
(a) If the algorithm is in a reconciling state, then the algorithm terminates.
(b) If the algorithm is not in a reconciling state, then the algorithm proceeds toHold
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Votes and Determine Approval.
5. The Hold Votes and Determine Approval component determines whether or not a
block can be added to the block chain. The behaviors corresponding to this event
are:
(a) If the vote does not lead to approval, then the algorithmproceeds to theReconcile
component.
(b) If the vote does lead to approval, then the algorithm proceeds to the Verify
Chain component.
6. The Verify Chain component determines whether or not the chain has changed since
the vote was initiated. This can lead to the following outcomes:
(a) If the chain is not verified (i.e., it has changed), then the algorithm proceeds to
the Hold Votes and Determine Approval component.
(b) If the chain is verified (i.e., it is unchanged), then the algorithm proceeds to the
Receive Message to Commit Block component.
7. When the Commit Block to Chain component commits a block, the process enters
an idle state while it waits for the next externally generated event.
8. When the Reconcile component is called, the algorithm proceeds to complete the
Reconcile Process and then waits for another externally generated event.
The behavior identified in this section is depicted in figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. Abstracted version of the state model of UCP.
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4.2.2 Monterey Phoenix Code
Following abstraction of the UCPs consensus process, we can convert the abstracted algo-
rithm into MP code. In Table 4.2, we identify each segment of code as well as the behavior
it models.
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DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;






DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;









DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
3 - Hear Hash on Top
of Hash not in Chain
12 INTERNAL SHARE ALL Reconcile; None
4.2.3 Discussion
In this section we analyze the results that we received when we compiled theMPmodel. The
full results from the compiled MP model are contained in Appendix B.3. Here we describe
how the results from the MP model satisfy the statement made at the beginning of Section
4.2:
1. Statement - If a UV’s protocol event handlers are in an idle state, then all of its
completed blocks must be committed to its local block chain.
Analysis - To satisfy this statement, we must establish that the program does not
stop running until all of its completed blocks have been committed to the chain. For
this to hold true, the algorithm can only terminate with the Commit Block to Chain
component or the Reconcile component. The reason this is the case is because the
Reconcile component commits all blocks to the block chain before it terminates.
Likewise, theCommit Block to Chain component will continue to commit blocks to
the block chain until its run out of blocks. In theMPmodel, every trace endedwith
the Commit Block to Chain or the Reconcile component. These results, therefore,
satisfy this statement.
4.3 Chapter Summary
To recap, in this chapter we examined two models of the Uniform Chain Protocol (UCP)
that we represented with Monterey Phoenix (MP). By examining these models, we were
able to verify that the UCP behaved as intended. We also discussed how these two models
served to verify the correctness of the four statements we identified at the beginning of the
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chapter. In the next chapter, we will discuss how early results provided byMP influenced the




In this chapter, we discuss design changes we made to Uniform Chain Protocol (UCP)
that were influenced by MP and the results of our field tests. Both MP and our field tests
demonstrated the behavioral correctness of UCP. For details of the trace evaluation process
and the full trace results, refer to Appendix A and Appendix B. For the results of the field
tests, refer to Appendix C.
5.1 Monterey Phoenix
In this section, we discuss two design flaws we discovered in the development of UCP as a
direct result of the behavioral modeling we performed usingMP. By discovering these flaws
early, we were able to tweak the design of UCP to eliminate the bugs before developing an
actual implementation. For this section, we examine the following two bugs:
1. FiveDroneBug - The first bug that was discovered in our original algorithmpermitted
an agent to loop indefinitely in the reconcile process. This problem presented itself
when we first ran the consensus model in MP and was in the following steps:
(a) The UV attempts to commit a block and cannot because its block chain has
diverged from the majority chain of local UVS.
(b) The UV reconciles with the local UVS but does not receive the majority of the
votes needed to commit a block.
(c) The UV attempts to commit the block and is again unable to do so.
(d) Steps b and c are repeated indefinitely.
Figure 5.1 depicts the MP trace in which the five drone bug occurs. In this model,
a block was removed from the block chain and then immediately re-added. This
occurs when the block the UV is trying to commit has a plurality of the votes in
the local UVS, but lacks the majority required to finalize the commit. Therefore, the
attempt to commit the block fails and the agent has to immediately reconcile again.
This behavior violates Characteristic 6 from Chapter 4, because it prevents a uniform
chain from emerging in a fully connected system. To resolve this bug, we added the
following:
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(a) A statement into the protocol that requires the UV to commit all of its blocks
at the end of reconcile.
(b) A requirement that UVs must reconcile if they receive a message that shows
another UV reconciling towards a different block chain.
With those two adjustments to the protocol, we conducted further UCP testing that
verified the elimination of the Five Drones Bug.
Figure 5.1. Five Drone Bug displayed in the model.
2. Altered Chain Bug - While running the state model, we encountered a race condition
that could cause corruption of the block chain. In this scenario, the UV commits a
block while it is in the process of conducting a vote to commit a previously generated
block. In Figure 5.2, we can see a block being committed while a vote is in progress.
If a different block is committed to the chain while the vote is in progress, it will
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be altered from its pre-vote state. If the vote being conducted leads to the block’s
commitment, then the block will be committed to the altered block chain. This
will cause the chain to be corrupted and will prevent a uniform block chain from
emerging, violating characteristic 6 from Chapter 4. To resolve this problem, we
simply added a check to the UCP’s commit process. After conducting a vote, but
before committing a block, the UCP verifies that the top chain hash did not
change while the vote was being conducted. If the top chain hash did change,
UCP conducts a new vote with a new top chain hash. Testing of the updated
model in MP verified that addition of the verification check of the top chain hash
eliminates the Altered Chain Bug.
Figure 5.2. Altered Chain Bug displayed in the model.
5.2 Field Tests
We conducted field tests of UCP at Camp Roberts, CA in November 2020. In the field tests,
we ran an implementation of the UCP on the ARSENL UAV swarm system. The ARSENL
system employs the Zephyr II fixed wing aircraft and Mosquito Hawk quadrotors designed
and built at NPS. These aircraft are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. During the
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experiment, the swarm consisted of a total of five UAVs that were launched consecutively.
After launch, the UCP ran for approximately thirty minutes while the system executed
various swarm behaviors. By their very nature, field tests involve a UVS that is not fully
connected, the exact sort of system for which this protocol was developed. As a result, we
did not expect a uniform block chain to emerge (Characteristic 6). At the conclusion of
the field tests, we downloaded the block chains for each of the five UAVs used in the test.
Highlights from the field tests include the following:
• We discovered three implementation bugs:
1. A syntax error in the reconciliation response dictionary from Section 3.6.3. This
error was promptly fixed by correcting the syntax.
2. A syntax error in the implementation of the timers. The syntax was corrected.
3. A logical error in the implementation of the Phase 3 Response in Section 3.6.3.
This was fixed in the implementation by altering the implementation to match
UCP.
• Importantly, we discovered no protocol bugs. This further validates that UCP works
as intended.
• Three of the fiveUAVs successfully ranUCP and achieved consistent block chains.
The other two encountered the aforementioned implementation bugs which prevented
them from running UCP successfully. The block chains files downloaded from
these UAVs are located in Appendix C.
Overall, the field tests were successful as we found no bugs in the UCP. This serves to
further validate the correctness of UCP.
5.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we examined two design bugs in the UCP that were identified using MP. We
also presented the design changes we made to UCP to eliminate these bugs. Furthermore,
we discussed the results of the successful field tests we conducted at Camp Roberts. In the
next chapter, we provide a conclusion and identify future work that may stem from this
thesis.
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Figure 5.3. A Zephyr fixed-wing UAV being launched at Camp Roberts, CA.
Figure 5.4. A Mosquito Hawk quadrotor UAV.
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This thesis contributes a novel Distributed Ledger Protocol (DLP) that assures the availabil-
ity of data generated by distributed, autonomous, multi-vehicle systems for post-mission
analysis. The Uniform Chain Protocol (UCP), which was designed and verified in this thesis
project, provides Unmanned Vehicle Systems (UVS) the ability to distribute data across all
Unmanned Vehicles (UV) in the system. The intent of distributing data in this project was
that it allows the data to be saved for post-mission analysis. UCP prevents data generated
during a mission from being lost, even if the UV that generated the data does not survive
the mission. Monterey Phoenix (MP) was used to verify the behavioral correctness of this
program in small examples. In the MP models, we showed that no apparent issues exist
within UCP. Finally, field tests were conducted to validate the functionality of UCP. While
conducting these field tests, we found no errors in the UCP, which further serves to validate
that UCP works as it was designed to. For the rest of this chapter, we will discuss the
implications of UCP for the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as future work that may
originate from this thesis.
6.1 Implications
TheUCP is especially useful for an organization like theDoD. In the design ofUCP,wemade
the assumption that the protocol would be run on vehicles that experience destruction or
network disconnection. TheDoDoperates within an environment whereUVs are assumed to
be at a risk of being damaged or destroyed. In that aspect, theDoD can benefit from resilience
provided by the UCP. Although UCP was designed for UVs, there is no requirement that
UCP be run only on UVs. Manned vehicles, or any other distributed vehicle system, has
the potential to run UCP. Likewise, although the target domain for UCP is airspace, UCP
has no design requirement that prevents it from being implemented on land, space, or water
based vehicles. The culmination of these characteristics makes UCP a great asset for use in
distributed, multi-vehicle, autonomous systems.
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6.2 Future Work
The work conducted in this thesis has uncovered numerous possibilities for future work.
These possibilities include the following work:
Monterey Phoenix Upgrade - The RIGAL compiler that MP runs was developed
in 1992. Due to its age, the MP platform is a legacy 32-bit application. Since 32-bit
applications are limited to 4GB of RAM, MPs ability to perform exhaustive traces
is greatly diminished by its lack of resources. If MP were upgraded to a 64-bit
application, the memory constraint would be alleviated. Upgrading MP from a 32-bit
application to a 64-bit application would be a great use of resources.
Further Development ofMonterey Phoenix (MP)Models - We created twomodels
using MP for this project, but we have the ability to create more models and prove
more behaviors. In this project, we had to limit our scope to creating a protocol that
satisfied all of the design requirements. There may be more behaviors that we want
to verify with MP and those behaviors could be addressed in future work.
Proofs in COQ - COQ is a mathematical theorem proving tool that was developed
in the 1980’s [16]. COQ proofs can be created and compared to the models that we
created in this project withMP. Thiswould enable further validation of the correctness
of UCP. It could also lead to the discovery of other behaviors that were not identified
by our MP model.
Time Complexity of UCP - In this thesis project, we completed design, validation
and implementation. In the future, it would be an excellent contribution to evaluate
the time complexity in the best case, worst case and average case of UCP. This work
could be used to determine how well UCP performs in comparison to other types of
distributed ledger protocol (DLP).
Formal Mathematical Methods - In this thesis, we conducted lightweight proofs
with Monterey Phoenix (MP). In future work, it would be beneficial to the determine
what kinds of things can be formally proven about UCP. The exploration of this type




Monterey Phoenix Consensus Results
This appendix contains the results for the Monterey Phoenix consensus traces with com-
mentary.
A.1 Analyzing the Results
To understand these results, we must examine them within the context of the design intent.
To analyze these results, its recommended to follow these steps:
1. Examine with the first event following RECONCILE. Proceed to step 2.
2. In this step, we make a determination of whether or not the behavior exhibited up to
this event in the trace is intended.We desire to answer the following general questions:
• Are the events that led to this event intended in the design of the Uniform Chain
Protocol (UCP)?
• Are there any scenarios where this behavior is not intended?
To determine the answer to the general questions, we bear in mind the characteristics
we identified in Section 4.1. We ask the following specific questions:
(a) Does the behavior up to this point in the trace demonstrate more than one copy
of a block being stored on the block chain?
(b) Is this a fully connected system (Does not contain a No_Response event)? If so,
are any blocks not committed to the block chain?
(c) If this is a fully connected system, does it demonstrate that one uniform block
chain does not emerge?
If any of these questions result in an answer of “yes”, then the behavior exhibited by
this trace is unintended. This shows us that the our protocol has a design flaw that
must be resolved. If the answer to all of these questions is “no”, then we can conclude
that this trace does not demonstrate a design flaw in the UCP. We now proceed to
Step 3.
Note : When asking these questions, we must be mindful that we may have abstracted
away details in our model. For example, in this model we abstracted away locks.
Therefore, we are not really particularly concerned with race conditions in the context
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of this model.
3. If this is the last event in the model, the behavior is correct if we discovered no
unintended behavior. If it is not the last event, we examine the next event. We now
proceed back to Step 2.
A.2 Example
In this section, we use Figure A.1 as an example of how to analyze the MP results. The steps
are completed as follows:
Step 1. Examine Phase_1_Vote.
Step 2. Answer questions a, b, and c. Proceed to Step 3.
a. No. Does not demonstrate a block being stored more than once.
b. No. Does not demonstrate that blocks are left to commit.
c. No. Does not demonstrate a full block chain does not emerge.
Step 3. Examine next event. This is No_Response. Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a, b, and c. Proceed to Step 3.
a. No. Does not demonstrate a block being stored more than once.
b. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was encountered.
c. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was encountered.
Step 3. Examine next event. This is Reconcile_Finalize. Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a, b, and c. Proceed to Step 3.
a. No. Does not demonstrate a block being stored more than once.
b. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was previously
encountered.
c. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was previously
encountered.
Step 3. Examine next event. This is Stack_Empty. Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a, b, and c. Proceed to Step 3.
a. No. Does not demonstrate a block being stored more than once.
b. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was previously
encountered.
c. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was previously
encountered.
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Step 3. Examine next event. This is End. Proceed to Step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a, b, and c. Proceed to Step 3.
a. No. Does not demonstrate a block being stored more than once.
b. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was previously
encountered.
c. No. Not in a fully connected system because No_Response was previously
encountered.
Step 3. End is the last event. All of the Step 2 questions received a “no” answer, so
the trace completed with no unintended behavior.
A.3 Results
Figure A.1. This traces a scenario where the UAV is disconnected from the
UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.2. This traces a scenario where the UAV is disconnected from the
UVS. This behavior is intended.
Figure A.3. This traces a scenario where the UAV finds the top hash imme-
diately. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.4. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.5. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles with
the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.6. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles with
the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.7. This traces a scenario where the UAV starts to reconcile with
the UVS and then becomes disconnected. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.8. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
Figure A.9. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.10. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles
with the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.11. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles
with the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.12. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.13. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles
with the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.14. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.15. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.16. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.17. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.18. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.19. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.20. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles
with the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.21. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.22. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.23. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles
with the UVS. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.24. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.25. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.26. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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Figure A.27. This traces a scenario where the UAV successfully reconciles
with the UVS. This behavior is intended.
119
Figure A.28. This traces a scenario where the UAV becomes disconnected
from the UVS while its reconciling. This behavior is intended.
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APPENDIX B:
Monterey Phoenix State Results
This appendix contains the results for the Monterey Phoenix state traces with commentary.
B.1 Analyzing the Results
To understand these results, we must examine them within the context of the design intent.
To analyze these results, its recommended to follow these steps:
1. Examine the first event following INTERNAL.
2. Next, we ask the following general questions:
• Are the events that led to this event intended in the design of UCP?
• Are there any scenarios where this behavior is not intended?
To determine the answer to these questions, we reference the characteristic we are
trying to verify in Section 4.2. We ask the following specific questions:
(a) Is the UV in an idle state?
(b) Does this behavior demonstrate that any of the completed blocks are not com-
mitted to the block chain?
If both of these questions result in an answer of “yes”, then the behavior exhibited by
this trace is unintended. This shows us that the our protocol has a design flaw that must
be resolved. If the answer to either of these questions is “no”, then we can conclude
that this trace does not demonstrate a design flaw in the UCP. We now proceed to
Step 3.
Note : When asking these questions, we must be mindful that we may have abstracted
away details in our model. For example, in this model we abstracted away locks.
Therefore, we aren’t really particularly concerned with race conditions in the context
of this model.
3. If this is the last event in the model, the behavior has been verified if no unintended
behavior was discovered. If it is not the last event, we examine the next event. We
now proceed back to Step 2.
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B.2 Example
In this example, We use Figure B.1 as an example of how to analyze the MP results. The
steps are completed as follows:
Step 1. Examine Hear_Hash_on_Top_of_Hash_Not_Present.
Step 2. Answer questions a and b. Proceed to Step 3.
a. No. Not in an idle state.
b. No. We have not demonstrated that any completed blocks are not in the
block chain.
Step 3. Examine next event. This is Not_Reconciling. Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a and b.
a. No. Not in an idle state.
b. No. We have not demonstrated that any completed blocks are not in the
block chain.
Step 3. Examine next event. This is Reconcile. Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a and b.
a. No. Not in an idle state.
b. No. We have not demonstrated that any completed blocks are not in the
block chain.
Step 3. Examine next event. This is Enter_Reconcile. Proceed to step 2.
Step 2. Answer questions a and b.
a. No. Not in an idle state. Enter_Reconcile is not considered an idle state.
b. No. We have not demonstrated that completed blocks are not in the block
chain.
Step 3. Enter_Reconcile is the last event. All of the Step 2 questions received a “no”
answer, so the trace completed with no unintended behavior.
B.3 Results
Figure B.1. This figure traces a scenario where nothing occurs. This behavior
is intended.
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Figure B.2. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard and the UAV reconciles. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.3. This figure traces a scenario where a Hash on top of a Hash is
heard while the UAV is reconciling. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.4. This figure traces a scenario where a block is committed. This
behavior is intended.
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Figure B.5. This figure traces a scenario where a block is committed and
a hash on top of a hash is heard and the UAV reconciles. This behavior is
intended.
Figure B.6. This figure traces a scenario where a block is committed and a
hash on top of a hash is heard while the UAV reconciling. This behavior is
intended.
Figure B.7. This figure traces a scenario where a block is can’t be commit-
ted. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.8. This figure traces a scenario where a block is can’t be committed
and a hash on top of a hash is heard and the UAV reconciles. This behavior
is intended.
Figure B.9. This figure traces a scenario where a block is can’t be committed
and a hash on top of a hash is heard while the UAV reconciles. This behavior
is intended.
Figure B.10. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready while the UAV reconciles. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.11. This figure traces a scenario where a a hash on top of a hash
is heard causing the UAV to reconcile. Thereafter, a block is determined to
be ready while the UAV reconciles. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.12. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready while the UAV reconciles and a hash on top of a hash is heard at
the same time. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.13. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready while the UAV reconciles. Immediately after reconcile finishes, the
UAV gets a commit message. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.14. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.15. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.16. This figure traces a scenario block is determined to be ready,
and a commit message is received. This behavior is intended.
127
Figure B.17. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.18. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.19. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.20. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, and a block is determined to be ready. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.21. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready, and a commit message is received. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.22. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.23. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready, and a commit message is received. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.24. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.25. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.26. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.27. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, and a block is determined to be ready. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.28. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready, and a commit message is received. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.29. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.30. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.31. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.32. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, and block is determined to be ready. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.33. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, and block is determined to be ready. This behavior is intended.
Figure B.34. This figure traces a scenario where a block is determined to
be ready, and a commit message is received. This behavior is intended.
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Figure B.35. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, s block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.
This behavior is intended.
Figure B.36. This figure traces a scenario where a hash on top of a hash is
heard, a block is determined to be ready, and a commit message is received.




This appendix contains the results for the field tests conducted at CampRoberts. The purpose
of this appendix is to provide a concrete example of the results for the field test.
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Figure C.1. The block chain from the UAV with ID number 10.
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Figure C.2. The block chain from the UAV with ID number 28.
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Figure C.3. The block chain from the UAV with ID number 32. This UAV
did not function properly.
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Figure C.4. The block chain from the UAV with ID number 120.
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Figure C.5. The block chain from the UAV with ID number 122. This
UAV did not function properly.
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